Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 15, 2024
Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, and George Barros
July 15, 2024, 7pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day alongside the static maps current on this report.
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Click here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces day by day by exhibiting a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.
Note: The knowledge cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on July 15. ISW will cowl subsequent stories within the July 16 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
A latest Ukrainian ballot signifies that Ukrainians extensively reject Russia’s calls for for complete Ukrainian capitulation, emphasizing that the Kremlin’s circumstances for the top of the battle are solely unreasonable and extensively unpopular inside Ukraine. Ukrainian outlet Dzerkalo Tyzhnya commissioned a ballot by the Ukrainian Razumkov Center and revealed its outcomes on July 15.[1] The ballot discovered that 83 p.c of respondents rejected Putin’s assertion that Ukraine should withdraw from all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts — together with territory in these oblasts at present below Ukrainian management.[2] The ballot additionally reported that 58 p.c of respondents said that Ukraine mustn’t comply with enshrine a impartial, non-aligned, and non-nuclear standing in its structure. Putin demanded in June 2024 that Ukraine acknowledge Russia’s territorial claims over japanese and southern Ukraine (together with territory that Russia doesn’t at present occupy), “demilitarize,” and pledge to not be part of NATO as preconditions to start “peace” negotiations.[3] Putin’s excessive phrases are tantamount to Ukraine’s capitulation, indicating that Putin continues to be bored with good-faith negotiations on any phrases apart from Russia’s. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov not too long ago accused NATO on July 14 of not respecting “Russia’s main concern” when NATO introduced Ukraine’s prospects of admission into the alliance, claiming that the alliance’s conduct means that there isn’t a foundation for negotiations in regards to the battle in Ukraine.[4] Putin’s framing of Ukraine’s complete capitulation as an affordable precondition for peace negotiations can be a part of an try to undermine Ukraine’s efforts to garner worldwide help for Ukraine’s personal professional negotiating positions, that are based mostly on and backed by worldwide legislation, by shifting worldwide perceptions of logical negotiating phrases in Russia’s favor. Continued Russian efforts to assert that Ukraine is refusing “reasonable” calls for intend to solid Ukraine because the unreasonable actor, although Ukraine’s rightful borders have been acknowledged by worldwide legislation since 1991.
Ukraine continues to exhibit its willingness to barter with Russia on Ukraine’s personal phrases, and Ukraine’s calls for for a peace settlement are in accordance with worldwide legislation — in direct distinction to Russia’s unwillingness to interact in negotiations that finish in something wanting full Ukrainian give up. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on July 15 that Ukrainian plans for a second peace summit must be prepared by November 2024 and reiterated {that a} Russian consultant ought to attend.[5] Zelensky said that in preparation, Ukraine will maintain a gathering in Qatar on vitality safety in late July or early August 2024, a gathering on freedom of navigation in Turkey in August 2024, and a gathering on prisoner of battle (POW) exchanges and the repatriation of deported Ukrainian youngsters in Canada in September 2024 — three points on which the communique of the primary Ukraine-initiated Global Peace Summit in Switzerland in June 2024 centered.[6] Recent Kremlin statements proceed to exhibit that Russia is rigid on negotiations with Ukraine, nonetheless, and Kremlin officers have immediately said that Russia wouldn’t take part in a second peace summit as a result of its phrases are a non-starter given Russian calls for.[7] Ukrainian officers emphasised that the aim of the primary peace summit was to facilitate a peace based mostly on worldwide legislation, together with legal guidelines to which the Russian Federation is celebration.[8] Ukraine’s calls for that Russia fully withdraw from Ukrainian territory are supplied for below worldwide legislation and are due to this fact affordable. Russia’s calls for for Ukraine’s full capitulation and continued Russian occupation of Ukrainian land are and can be violations of worldwide legislation, nonetheless. ISW additionally continues to evaluate that Putin’s calls for for Ukrainian capitulation would permit Russian forces and occupation administrations to proceed their large-scale and deliberate ethnic cleaning campaigns in occupied Ukraine, and the entire reinstatement of Ukraine’s territory integrity is critical to liberate the Ukrainian individuals from Russian occupation.[9] An acceptance of something however Ukraine’s liberation of its individuals is an implicit endorsement of Russia’s unlawful occupation of over 5 million Ukrainians.
European Union (EU) officers proceed to take steps to exhibit the EU’s non-alignment with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s political stances regarding the battle in Ukraine. Balazs Orban, Viktor Orban’s Political Director, said on July 15 that Viktor Orban has further “trips and negotiations” deliberate and wrote to the European Council about his earlier visits to and discussions about negotiations with Ukraine, Russia, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the US.[10] EU Commission Spokesperson Eric Mamer said on July 15 that as a consequence of Orban’s latest actions, EU leaders, together with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, wouldn’t attend casual conferences led by Hungary.[11] Politico reported on July 15 that three unspecified EU diplomats said that EU High Commissioner Josep Borrel will maintain a “formal” overseas affairs council assembly similtaneously Hungary’s overseas affairs summit in Budapest in late August 2024.[12] A supply reportedly said that different EU overseas ministers wish to “send a clear signal that Hungary does not speak for the EU.” Swedish Minister for EU Affairs Jessika Roswall advised Reuters on July 11 that Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland would solely ship civil servants to authorities conferences linked with Hungary’s EU Council presidency in July 2024 and that different EU states are contemplating comparable measures.[13]
The Russian authorities proposed to considerably improve the variety of circumstances on which the Russian authorities can designate an individual as a terrorist or extremist, seemingly as a part of efforts to censor criticisms about Russia’s battle in Ukraine. The Russian authorities submitted a invoice to the State Duma on July 15 that might increase the variety of articles of the Russian Criminal Code below which the Russian Federal Service for Financial Monitoring (Rosfinmonitoring) may add individuals to Russia’s record of terrorists and extremists.[14] The proposal notably would permit Rosfinmonitoring so as to add individuals whom Russian authorities have convicted of spreading “fakes” in regards to the Russian navy out of political, ideological, racial, nationwide, or spiritual hatred to the record. The proposal would additionally permit Rosfinmonitoring so as to add individuals accused of committing unspecified “other crimes” motivated by political, ideological, racial, nationwide, or spiritual hatred to the record — granting the Russian authorities vital leeway to designate individuals who have allegedly dedicated a wide selection of crimes as terrorists and extremists. The Kremlin has repeatedly tried to painting Russia as a harmonious multinational and multireligious society regardless of latest will increase in xenophobic rhetoric from Russia’s ultranationalist neighborhood.[15] The Russian authorities is probably going seeking to change the mechanisms for including individuals to the terrorist and extremist record with a purpose to incentivize Russians to interact in self-censorship by tightening the Kremlin’s management over criticism in Russian society, particularly about Russia’s battle in Ukraine, whereas posturing these modifications as a part of efforts to make sure political and spiritual freedom and societal concord in Russia.
Ukrainian forces performed drone strikes towards Russian vitality infrastructure in a single day on July 14 to 15 and reportedly additionally hit Russian navy property in occupied Crimea. Lipetsk Oblast Head Igor Artamonov claimed on July 15 {that a} Ukrainian drone struck the grounds of {an electrical} substation in Stanovlyansky Raion, Lipetsk Oblast, and the Oryol Oblast administration claimed {that a} Ukrainian drone broken an oil storage container after Russian digital warfare (EW) suppressed the drone over a gasoline and vitality complicated within the Oryolsky Raion.[16] A neighborhood Crimean channel claimed that Ukrainian drones struck both a Russian S-300/S-400 air protection system or a Black Sea Fleet (BSF) digital intelligence unit close to occupied Cape Fiolent, however ISW is unable to substantiate this strike.[17] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed six Ukrainian drones over occupied Crimea and one Ukrainian drone over Lipetsk Oblast in a single day on July 14 to 15 and one other Ukrainian drone close to western Crimea on the afternoon of July 15.[18]
A brand new Russian migrant assimilation program highlights the obvious battle the Russian authorities is going through with reconciling elements of its coverage in direction of Central Asian migrants because the Russian state wishes to current itself as welcoming and multicultural whereas additionally emphasizing the primacy of Russian language and historic legacy. Kremlin-affiliated business-focused outlet Kommersant reported on July 15 that the Russian Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs (FADN) has developed a 70-minute lecture for Central Asian migrants on the best way to adapt to life in Russia.[19] Kommersant reportedly reviewed the course, which has 4 sections: “fundamentals of migration and labor legislation,” “fundamentals of informal behavior in Russia,” “responsibility for non-compliance with Russian legislation,” and “the history of relations between Russian and the countries of Central Asia.” The course reportedly emphasizes that migrants might bear a simplified course of for buying citizenship in the event that they select to serve with the Russian navy, suggesting that the Russian authorities continues to make use of the promise of citizenship as a technique of luring Central Asian migrants into the military. The course additionally stresses that “it is important to remember that Russia is a secular state” so migrants should not carry out spiritual rituals, together with day by day prayers, in public areas and that “Russians are a multinational people, but everyone speaks Russian.” Kommersant discovered that the course presents a paternalistic and Russia-centric model of Central Asian historical past, claiming that “big money from the Soviet budget allowed the Central Asian republics to develop successfully.”
The purposed assimilation lecture distills a number of of the tensions that at present exist in Russia’s relationship with its migrant minority communities, notably these from numerous Central Asian states. As ISW has written at size, Russia’s reliance on Central Asian migrants to help Russia’s labor drive and maintain navy mobilization efforts, has brought about substantial frictions inside such communities, notably as many pro-war ultranationalist voices have espoused more and more xenophobic rhetoric over the backdrop of the battle in Ukraine.[20] Head of the Russian Federal Service for the Supervision of Education and Science (Rosnobrnadzor) Anzor Muzaev, for instance, advocated that migrants’ youngsters should know Russian to review in Russian faculties.[21] Several ultranationalist commentators responded and prompt that the Russian authorities should undertake a harsher response that prohibits migrants from bringing their households to Russia or prohibits migrant youngsters from finding out in public faculties in any respect.[22] The FADN’s assimilation program is ostensibly meant to appease these tensions, however emphasizes that Russian language, historical past, and tradition are supposed to take pleasure in particular primacy in migrant communities—immediately undermining the Kremlin narrative that Russia is an open and accepting multicultural and multireligious society. This program may additionally improve tensions and emotions of disenfranchisement inside Central Asian migrant communities by imposing their isolation from their languages, customs, and spiritual practices.
Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov is posturing himself and the North Caucasus as key to Russia’s outreach to the Arab world. Kadyrov met on July 15 with United Arab Emirates (UAE) Ambassador to Russia Mohammed Akhmed Sultan Essa Al Jaber and Qatari Ambassador to Russia Sheikh Ahmed bin Nasser Al Thani in Grozny, Chechnya on the ongoing Caucasus Investment Forum.[23] Kadyrov emphasised Qatar’s and the UAE’s “warm relations” with Russia and Qatar, whereas additionally highlighting their particular person relationships with Chechnya and the broader Caucasus area. The Kremlin seemingly seeks to make use of the Caucasus’ distinctive geopolitical, spiritual, and socio-cultural positioning vis-a-vis the Arab world with a purpose to draw funding to the area and improve political and diplomatic ties with main political gamers reminiscent of Qatar and the UAE. Qatar and the UAE, for instance, proceed to mediate prisoner of battle (POW) exchanges and the repatriation of deported Ukrainian youngsters, so it stays in Russia’s curiosity to take care of agency ties with Gulf states.[24]
Key Takeaways:
- A latest Ukrainian ballot signifies that Ukrainians extensively reject Russia’s calls for for complete Ukrainian capitulation, emphasizing that the Kremlin’s circumstances for the top of the battle are solely unreasonable and extensively unpopular inside Ukraine.
- Ukraine continues to exhibit its willingness to barter with Russia on Ukraine’s personal phrases, and Ukraine’s calls for for a peace settlement are in accordance with worldwide legislation — in direct distinction to Russia’s unwillingness to interact in negotiations that finish in something wanting full Ukrainian give up.
- European Union (EU) officers proceed to take steps to exhibit the EU’s non-alignment with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s political stances regarding the battle in Ukraine.
- The Russian authorities proposed to considerably improve the variety of circumstances on which the Russian authorities can designate an individual as a terrorist or extremist, seemingly as a part of efforts to censor criticisms about Russia’s battle in Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces performed drone strikes towards Russian vitality infrastructure in a single day on July 14 to 15 and reportedly additionally hit Russian navy property in occupied Crimea.
- A brand new Russian migrant assimilation program highlights the obvious battle the Russian authorities is going through with reconciling elements of its coverage in direction of Central Asian migrants because the Russian state wishes to current itself as welcoming and multicultural whereas additionally emphasizing the primacy of Russian language and historic legacy.
- Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov is posturing himself and the North Caucasus as key to Russia’s outreach to the Arab world.
- Ukrainian forces not too long ago regained misplaced positions close to Toretsk, and Russian forces not too long ago superior close to Toretsk and Avdiivka.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasised ongoing Russian efforts to combine the metallurgy trade in occupied Ukraine into Russia’s protection industrial base (DIB).
We don’t report intimately on Russian battle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t immediately have an effect on the navy operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We will proceed to judge and report on the consequences of those felony actions on the Ukrainian navy and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We completely condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity regardless that we don’t describe them in these stories.
- Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate primary efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 15 however didn’t make confirmed advances. Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Colonel Yuriy Povkh said that Russian forces are getting ready new assault teams from parts of the “153rd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 47th Motorized Rifle Division” and 138th Motorized Rifle Brigade (sixth Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) for renewed assaults within the Kharkiv course.[25] Povkh might have misspoken and was most certainly referring to the 153rd Tank Regiment of the 47th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District [MMD]), because the 47th Motorized Rifle Division will not be confirmed to have a 153rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (in contrast to the 47th Tank Division, which reportedly has a 153rd Tank Regiment), is a part of the 40th Army Corps (18th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and has been preventing in southern Ukraine since September 2022.[26] ISW has noticed frequent mentions of the 47th Tank Division working in Kharkiv Oblast in latest months, whereas the deployment of the 47th Motorized Rifle Division from southern Ukraine would characterize a significant inflection.[27] Social media footage circulated on July 14 and 15 exhibits a Russian soldier of the “Storm” detachment of the 138th Motorized Rifle Brigade complaining about excessive losses throughout assaults in Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) and claiming that his unit misplaced 16 of 46 troopers throughout one assault.[28] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that preventing continued inside Vovchansk and close to Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City).[29] Elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade reportedly proceed working close to Vovchansk.[30]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Capture the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations alongside the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on July 15 however didn’t make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior as much as 300 meters east of Makiivka (northwest of Kreminna), though ISW has not noticed visible proof of this declare.[31] Russian forces continued attacking northwest of Svatove close to Pishchane and Stelmakhivka; northwest of Kreminna close to Makiivka and Hrekivka; and west of Kreminna close to Terny on July 14 and 15.[32] Elements of the Russian 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (third Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly working close to Makiivka.[33]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Capture the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued assaults within the Siversk space on July 15 however didn’t make any confirmed advances. Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk close to Bilohorivka, east of Siversk close to Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk close to Spirne and Vyimka on July 14 and 15.[34] Elements of the Russian 2nd Artillery Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) reportedly proceed to function within the Siversk course.[35]
Russian forces didn’t make any confirmed good points amid continued preventing close to Chasiv Yar on July 15. Russian forces attacked inside easternmost Chasiv Yar; north of Chasiv Yar close to Hryhorivka and Kalynivka; east of Chasiv Yar close to Ivanivske; and southeast of Chasiv Yar close to Andriivka on July 14 and 15.[36] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly proceed to function close to Chasiv Yar.[37]
Both Russian and Ukrainian forces not too long ago superior within the Toretsk course as preventing continued on July 15. Geolocated footage revealed on July 14 exhibits that Ukrainian forces not too long ago recaptured some positions inside southern Niu York (south of Toretsk) and confirms some claims of Russian advance throughout the metropolis.[38] Additional geolocated footage revealed on July 15 exhibits that Russian forces not too long ago marginally superior inside japanese Pivnichne (east of Toretsk).[39] Russian forces additionally continued to assault inside Zalizne (instantly southeast of Toretsk) on July 14 and 15, the place Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior.[40] ISW has not noticed affirmation of those claimed Russian advances in Zalizne, nonetheless.
Russian forces not too long ago superior northwest of Avdiivka amid continued preventing on July 15. Geolocated footage revealed on July 15 exhibits that Russian forces superior inside central Yevhenivka (northwest of Avdiivka).[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces additionally superior 1.12 kilometers deep alongside a railway line east of Prohres (northwest of Avdiivka), as much as 1.2 kilometers deep in fields southeast of Novoselivka Persha (northwest of Avdiivka), and marginally on the outskirts of Karlivka (southwest of Avdiivka), however ISW has not noticed affirmation of those claims.[42] Russian forces additionally attacked northwest of Avdiivka close to Novooleksandrivka, Vozdvyzhenka, and Lozuvatske; and west of Avdiivka close to Yasnobrodivka on July 14 and 15.[43] Elements of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC) are reportedly working within the Avdiivka course.[44]
Russian forces not too long ago marginally superior west of Donetsk City amid continued preventing within the space on July 15. Geolocated footage revealed on July 14 exhibits that Russian forces marginally superior inside western Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City), and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior even additional west inside and in fields south of Krasnohorivka.[45] Russian forces additionally continued attacking southwest of Donetsk City close to Paraskoviivka, Kostyantynivka, and Vodyane on July 14 and 15.[46] Elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly proceed working within the space west and southwest of Donetsk City.[47]
Russian forces didn’t make any confirmed advances amid continued preventing within the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border space on July 15. Russian forces continued attacking south of Velyka Novosilka close to Makarivka on July 14 and 15.[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces try to advance north of Urozhaine (south of Velyka Novosilka) following claims that Russian forces seized the settlement on July 14, however one milblogger claimed on July 15 that Ukrainian forces retain some positions inside northern Urozhaine.[49] Russian milbloggers credited the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 30th Artillery Brigade, and fifth Tank Brigade (all the 36th Combined Arms Army, EMD) and 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD) with seizing Urozhaine.[50]
Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian goal: Maintain frontline positions and safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes)
Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 15, however there have been no confirmed modifications to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior as much as 500 meters in two unspecified areas within the Orikhiv course (western Zaporizhia Oblast).[51] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults northwest of Robotyne close to Novoandriivka and northwest of Robotyne close to Mala Tokmachka on July 15.[52] Elements of the Russian 19th Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly working within the Orikhiv course; and parts of the “Valkyrie” Special Detachment (4th Military Base, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly working close to Kamyanske (northwest of Robotyne).[53]
Positional engagements continued in east (left) financial institution Kherson Oblast, together with close to Krynky, on July 15.[54] Russian milbloggers claimed that preventing is ongoing on the Dnipro River Delta islands.[55] Elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (seventh VDV Division) and 70th Motorized Rifle Division and 126th Coastal Defense Brigade (each of the 18th CAA, SMD) are working within the Kherson course.[56]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian navy and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces launched two D-30SN glide bombs with common joint glide munitions (UMPBs) at Myrhorod, Donetsk Oblast on July 14 and struck a residential constructing and academic establishment.[57]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian goal: Expand fight energy with out conducting normal mobilization)
Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasised ongoing Russian efforts to combine the metallurgy trade in occupied Ukraine into Russia’s protection industrial base (DIB).[58] Putin claimed in a July 15 speech for Russia’s Metallurgist Day that the Russian metallurgy trade is strategically necessary to Russia’s protection and safety and continues to develop regardless of Western sanctions. Putin claimed that the manufacturing of steel merchandise in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts has elevated by 30 p.c in 2023 from 2022.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) introduced on July 15 the completion of Russia’s Spring 2024 conscription cycle.[59] The Russian MoD claimed that the Russian navy conscripted 150,000 personnel and reiterated reassurances that Russian conscripts don’t serve in occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and did take part in fight operations in Ukraine.[60] ISW continues to evaluate that Russia coerced conscripts into signing Russian navy contracts to help ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.[61]
Russian opposition shops reported that pro-war Russian Telegram channels try to threaten mobilized personnel and their kinfolk towards voicing complaints towards the Russian navy and advocating for demobilization. Russian opposition shops Astra and Mobilization News reported that pro-war Russian Telegram channels revealed a video of Russian troopers purportedly claiming that “provocateurs” are organizing rallies in help demobilization after kinfolk of Russian mobilized personnel advocated for his or her family members’ demobilization.[62] The Russian opposition shops reported that pro-war Russian Telegram channels had truly re-dubbed an present video of Russian troopers discussing a unique matter with a purpose to threaten mobilized personnel and their kinfolk from talking out towards the Russian navy.
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian goal: Introduce technological improvements to optimize programs to be used in Ukraine)
Russian state-owned protection conglomerate Rostec reported on July 15 that it’s at present creating an improved model of unified planning and correction modules (UMPCs) with a purpose to improve the vary of unguided glide bombs.[63] Rostec CEO Sergei Chemezov said that it’s less expensive and nonetheless efficient for Rostec to provide unguided glide bombs with UMPCs than guided glide bombs.[64] A Russian protection industrial base (DIB) supply advised Kremlin newswire TASS that FAB-3000 glide bombs with UMPCs have a variety of up 50 to 60 kilometers and that FAB-250 to FAB-1500 glide bombs, presumably with UMPCs, have a variety of as much as 60 to 70 kilometers.[65]
Rostec subsidiary United Aircraft Corporation said on July 15 that it handed over the primary batch of repaired and modernized MiG-31 fighter plane for 2024 to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[66]
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian goal: Develop its protection industrial base to turn out to be extra self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and worldwide companions)
Ukraine’s Western companions proceed to supply navy and monetary help to Ukraine. The German authorities introduced on July 8 that it delivered further navy help to Ukraine, together with ammunition for Leopard tanks, a Patriot air protection system and missiles, and 155mm artillery ammunition.[67] The Ukrainian Ministry of Economy said on July 9 that Ukraine and the European Union (EU) signed an settlement that regulates monetary help value 5.27 billion euros (about $5.7 billion) to help Ukraine’s financial system over the subsequent 4 years below the EU’s Ukraine Facility mechanism.[68] Portugal introduced on July 10 that Portuguese help to Ukraine will complete greater than 220 million euros (about $239 million) in 2024 and that Portugal will allocate the identical quantity in 2025.[69] New Zealand introduced a package deal on July 10 of six million NZD (about $3.6 million) value of navy help to Ukraine, together with two million NZD (about $1.2 million) to help Ukraine’s navy healthcare system.[70] New Zealand additionally introduced that it might present a package deal of ten million NZD (about $6 million) value of humanitarian help to Ukraine. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau introduced on July 11 a package deal of navy help value 500 million CAD (about $365 million) to Ukraine.[71] Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store said on July 11 that Norway will allocate one billion kroner (about $92 million) to help Ukraine’s air defenses.[72] The Lithuanian MoD said on July 11 that Lithuania provided drone jamming gear and 5.56x45mm NATO intermediate ammunition cartridges to Ukraine.[73] Spain said on July 15 that it started transferring 10 repaired Leopard tanks to Ukraine and that the tanks will first arrive in Poland on July 20 earlier than touring to Ukraine.[74]
The Czech-led artillery shell coalition will reportedly ship shells to Ukraine beginning in July 2024. Czech outlet Ceske Noviny reported on July 13 that Czech President Petr Pavel said that the coalition ought to ship 50,000 shells to Ukraine in July and August 2024 and 80,000 to 100,000 shells monthly from September 2024 to the top of 2024.[75]
Ukraine’s Western companions proceed to help the UK and Latvian-led drone coalition. The Swedish MoD introduced on July 11 that Sweden joined the coalition.[76] Members of the coalition — the Netherlands, UK, Latvia, New Zealand, and Sweden — signed a memorandum of understanding on July 10 that gives a framework for the coalition’s actions and procurement mechanisms to supply Ukraine with a million first-person view (FPV) drones.[77] The Dutch MoD said on July 10 that the Netherlands will present 20 million euros (about $21.8 million) to the drone coalition.[78] The New Zealand authorities introduced on July 10 it might present 4 million NZD (about $2.4 million) to help the drone coalition.[79]
Ukraine’s Western companions proceed to help the availability of F-16 plane to Ukraine. Norway said on July 10 that it’s going to present Ukraine with six F-16 plane at an unspecified time in 2024.[80] The Dutch MoD said on July 10 that the Netherlands would offer an extra 300 million euros (about $326 million) to buy ammunition for F-16 plane for Ukraine.[81] Canada introduced on July 11 that it allotted 389 million CAD (about $284 million) to help the coaching of Ukrainian F-16 pilots by the Ukraine Defense Contact Air Force Capability Coalition.[82]
Ukraine’s Western companions proceed to help Ukraine’s protection industrial base (DIB). The Danish Ministry of Defense (MoD) said on July 10 that Denmark financed the manufacturing of 18 Bohdana self-propelled howitzers in Ukraine, that are anticipated to reach to Ukrainian forces within the coming months.[83] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with representatives of US protection firms on July 11 and mentioned joint partnerships in Ukraine.[84] Ukraine’s state-owned protection enterprise supervisor Ukroboronprom signed an settlement on July 11 with US protection firm Northrop Grumman to create a brand new joint manufacturing line for NATO normal medium caliber artillery ammunition.[85]
Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian goal: Consolidate administrative management of annexed areas; forcibly combine Ukrainian residents into Russian sociocultural, financial, navy, and governance programs)
ISW will not be publishing protection of actions in Russian-occupied areas immediately.
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Russian milbloggers seized on a report from the Ukrainian General Staff on July 15 saying that Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi is conducting an investigation into the command of a Ukrainian brigade as a consequence of latest personnel losses with a purpose to unfold discontent and mistrust of the Ukrainian navy command.[86]
Russia continues to cost Ukrainian officers with invented and unsubstantiated crimes in absentia to implement Russian legislation outdoors of Russian authorized jurisdiction and insinuate that Ukraine mustn’t exist as an impartial state. The Moscow City Basmanny District Court issued in absentia battle crimes sentences towards former head of the Ukrainian State Security Service (SBU) Valentyn Nalyvaichenko and Secretary of the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Oleksandr Lytvynenko.[87]
Disinformation-focused analytical outlet NewsGuard reported on July 11 that it has recognized 41 English- and French-language TikTok accounts that use AI-generated narration to unfold disinformation, together with Kremlin narratives concerning the battle in Ukraine.[88] NewsGuard discovered that 17 of those accounts notably think about pro-Kremlin narratives, 14 of which use AI generated French-language narration.
Significant exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its navy presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group exercise in Belarus)
Nothing vital to report.
Note: ISW doesn’t obtain any categorized materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly obtainable data, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially obtainable satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial knowledge as the premise for these stories. References to all sources used are supplied within the endnotes of every replace.
