Vladimir Putin was aggravated – or perhaps simply bored. The Russian chief had been patiently fielding questions from a small group of worldwide journalists in the restaurant of a modest resort in Davos. Then one among the queries appeared to annoy him. He stared again at the questioner, an American, and stated slowly, via an interpreter: “I’ll answer that question in a minute. But first let me ask you about the extraordinary ring you have on your finger.”

All heads in the room swivelled. “Why is the stone so large?” Putin continued. Just a few of the viewers started to giggle and the journalist regarded uncomfortable. Putin took on a tone of mock sympathy and continued: “You surely don’t mind me asking, because you wouldn’t be wearing something like that unless you were trying to draw attention to yourself?” There was extra laughter. By now, the authentic query had been forgotten. It was a masterclass in distraction and bullying.

Sign as much as our Inside Saturday e-newsletter for an unique behind-the-scenes take a look at the making of the journal’s largest options, in addition to a curated checklist of our weekly highlights.

The 12 months was 2009, and Putin had already been in energy for nearly a decade. But this was my first encounter with him in the flesh, throughout his go to to the World Economic Forum. Putin’s means to radiate menace, with out elevating his voice, was hanging. But so was the laughter of his viewers. Despite the violence of his Russian authorities – as demonstrated in Chechnya and Georgia – western opinion-formers had been nonetheless inclined to deal with him as a pantomime villain.

I used to be reminded of this simply earlier than Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In a televised assembly at the Kremlin along with his closest advisers, Putin toyed with Sergei Naryshkin, the head of his overseas intelligence service – making the feared securocrat appear like a stuttering idiot. The pleasure he took in humiliating someone in entrance of an viewers was as soon as once more on show. But this time, no one was laughing. Putin was about to plunge Europe into its largest land warfare since 1945. Russian troops launched a full-scale invasion on 24 February. Within a month, greater than 10 million Ukrainians had fled their properties, hundreds of troops and civilians had been killed and the coastal metropolis of Mariupol had been destroyed.

An illustration of a missile

Even although western intelligence companies had warned for months that Russia was poised to assault, many skilled Putin-watchers, each in Russia and the west, refused to imagine it. After greater than 20 years of his management, they felt that they understood Putin. He was ruthless and violent, little doubt, however he was additionally believed to be rational, calculating and dedicated to Russia’s integration into the world financial system. Few believed he was able to such a reckless gamble.

Looking again, nonetheless, it’s clear that the outdoors world has constantly misinterpret him. From the second he took energy, outsiders too usually noticed what they needed and performed down the darkest sides of Putinism.

‘Speak plainly!’: Putin has tense alternate along with his spy chief – video

In reality, the outdoors world’s indulgence of Putin went a lot additional than merely turning a blind eye to his excesses. For a rising technology of strongman leaders and cultural conservatives outdoors Russia, Putin grew to become one thing of a hero and a job mannequin. As his admirers noticed it, the Russian chief had inherited a rustic humiliated by the breakup of the Soviet Union. Through energy and crafty, he had restored its standing and international energy, and even regained a few of the territory misplaced when the USSR broke up. And he had delighted nationalists and populists the world over by efficiently defying self-righteous American liberals equivalent to Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama. Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s spokesman, was not merely spouting propaganda when he stated in 2018: “There’s a demand in the world for special, sovereign leaders, for decisive ones … Putin’s Russia was the starting point.”

A black-and-white illustration of Xi Jinping against a blue background
Xi Jinping admires Putin’s strongman management fashion

The Putin fanclub has had quite a few members in the west over the years. Rudy Giuliani, President Trump’s shut adviser and lawyer, expressed admiration for Putin’s annexation of Crimea, remarking: “He makes a decision and he executes it, quickly. That’s what you call a leader.” Nigel Farage, the former chief of Ukip and the Brexit celebration, and a pal of Donald Trump, as soon as named Putin the world leader he most admired, including: “The way he played the whole Syria thing. Brilliant. Not that I approve of him politically.” Matteo Salvini, the chief of the populist proper Northern League celebration and a former deputy prime minister of Italy, flaunted his admiration for the Russian chief by being photographed in a Putin T-shirt in Red Square. Rodrigo Duterte, the president of the Philippines, has stated, “My favourite hero is Putin.”

Most essential of all, Xi Jinping can be a confirmed admirer. Per week after being appointed as president of China in early 2013, Xi made his first state go to abroad – selecting to go to Putin in Moscow. On 4 February 2022, simply 20 days earlier than the invasion of Ukraine, Putin met Xi in Beijing for his or her 38th summit assembly. Shortly afterwards, Russia and China introduced a “no limits” partnership. As the joint Russian-Chinese assertion made clear, the two leaders are united of their hostility to American international energy and to the pro-democracy “colour revolutions” they accuse Washington of stirring up round the world – from Ukraine to Hong Kong. Putin and Xi are each strongman rulers who have centralised energy round themselves and inspired a cult of character. They are, as Alexander Gabuev, a Russian educational, places it, “the tsar and the emperor”. Whether this partnership of strongmen will survive the Russian invasion of Ukraine is now one among the most essential questions in worldwide politics.


Putin was sworn into workplace as president of Russia on 31 December 1999. But at first it was not apparent that he would final very lengthy in the job, not to mention that he would emerge as the most aggressive challenger to the western liberal order and the pioneer of a brand new mannequin of authoritarian management. As the chaotic Yeltsin period of the 1990s drew to an in depth, Putin’s ascent to the prime job was eased by his former colleagues in the KGB. But he additionally had the approval of Russia’s richest and strongest individuals, the oligarchs, who noticed him as a succesful administrator and “safe pair of hands” who wouldn’t threaten established pursuits.

Viewed from the west, Putin regarded comparatively reassuring. In his first televised speech from the Kremlin, given on New Year’s Eve 1999, only a few hours after taking on from Yeltsin, Putin promised to “protect freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, freedom of the mass media, ownership rights, these fundamental elements of a civilised society”. In March 2000, he received his first presidential election and proudly asserted: “We have proved that Russia is becoming a modern democratic state.” When Bill Clinton met Putin in the Kremlin for the first time, in June 2000, he declared his Russian counterpart “fully capable of building a prosperous, strong Russia, while preserving freedom and pluralism and the rule of law”.

Yet whereas Putin could initially have discovered it handy to make use of the rhetoric of liberal democracy, his early actions as president instructed a distinct story. In his first 12 months in workplace, he moved instantly to rein in unbiased sources of energy, to say the central authority of the state and to make use of warfare to bolster his personal private place – all actions that had been to grow to be hallmarks of Putinism. The escalation of the warfare in Chechnya made Putin seem to be a nationalist hero, standing up for Russian pursuits and defending the abnormal citizen from terrorism. In an early transfer that alarmed liberals, the new president reinstated the previous Soviet nationwide anthem. His guarantees to guard media freedom turned out to be empty: Russia’s few unbiased tv networks had been introduced beneath authorities management.

As Putin established himself in workplace, the image-makers set to work crafting a strongman persona for him. Gleb Pavlovsky, one among Putin’s first spin docs, later described him as a “quick learner” and a “talented actor”. Key photographs had been positioned in the Russian media and round the world: Putin on horseback, Putin practising judo, Putin arm-wrestling or strolling bare-chested by a river in Siberia. These images attracted mockery from intellectuals and cynics. But the president’s handlers had been clear-eyed. As Pavlovsky later told the Washington Post, the objective was to make sure that “Putin corresponds ideally to the Hollywood image of a saviour-hero”.

An illustration of Vladimir Putin’s head in profile, overlaid with smaller images of Xi Jinping, Muammar Gaddafi, a Ukrainian flag, a missile, a ring on a finger and a tap on a pipe

In any case, Russians had been greater than prepared for a strongman to trip to their rescue. The collapse of the Soviet system in 1991 had allowed for the emergence of democracy and freedom of speech. But as the financial system atrophied after which fell aside, many skilled a extreme drop in dwelling requirements and private safety. By 1999, life expectancy for Russian males had fallen by three and a half years to beneath 60. A UN report attributed this to a “rise in self-destructive behaviour”, which it linked to “rising poverty rates, unemployment and financial insecurity”. Under these circumstances, a decisive chief who promised to show again the clock had actual enchantment.

Long earlier than Trump promised to “make America great again”, Putin was promising to deliver again the stability and delight of the Soviet period to these Russians who had misplaced out in the 1990s. But his nostalgia was not restricted to the social cohesion of Soviet instances. Putin additionally yearned to revive a few of the USSR’s misplaced worldwide clout. In a speech in 2005, Putin labelled the collapse of the Soviet Union “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century”. As the years have handed, he has grow to be more and more preoccupied by Russian historical past. In the summer season of 2021, he revealed a protracted essay entitled On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians – which, even at the time, some noticed as a manifesto for invasion. Delving via centuries of historical past, Putin tried to show that Ukraine was a synthetic state and that “Russia was robbed, indeed” when Ukraine gained independence in 1991.

Fyodor Lukyanov, an instructional who is near the Russian chief, instructed me in 2019 that one among Putin’s enduring fears was the lack of Russia’s standing as one among the world’s nice powers for the first time in centuries. His resentment at what he considered American slights and betrayals set Putin on a collision course with the west. A landmark second got here with a speech he gave at the Munich Security Conference in 2007.

That speech was a direct problem to the west and an expression of chilly fury. He accused the US of an “almost uncontained hyper use of force – military force – in international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts”. The Putin of 2000, who had expressed delight at Russia’s transformation into a contemporary democracy, had given strategy to a man who denounced western speak of freedom and democracy as a hypocritical entrance for energy politics.

The Munich speech was not simply an indignant reflection on the previous. It additionally pointed the strategy to the future. The Russian president had put the west on discover that he supposed to struggle again towards the US-led world order. It foreshadowed lots of what was to return: Russia’s army intervention in Georgia in 2008, its annexation of Crimea in 2014, its dispatch of troops to Syria in 2015, its meddling in the US presidential election of 2016. All of those actions burnished Putin’s status as a nationalist and a powerful chief. They additionally made him an icon for strongmen all through the world who rejected western management and the “liberal international order”.

This indictment of the west goes again to the 1990s. It is argued repeatedly in Moscow that the enlargement of Nato to soak up nations of the former Soviet empire (together with Poland and the Baltic states) was a direct contradiction of guarantees made after the finish of the chilly warfare. Nato’s intervention in the Kosovo warfare of 1998‑9 added to the checklist of grievances proving, in the Kremlin’s eyes, each that Nato is an aggressor and that western speak of respecting sovereignty and state borders was nothing however hypocrisy. Russians weren’t reassured by the western riposte that Nato was appearing in response to ethnic cleaning and human rights abuses by Serbia. As one liberal Russian politician put it to me in 2008, in a second of frankness: “We know we have committed human rights abuses in Chechnya. If Nato can bomb Belgrade for that, why could they not bomb Moscow?”

An illustration of a Ukrainian flag on a flagpole

Putin’s case towards Nato additionally takes in the Iraq warfare launched by the US and plenty of of its allies in 2003. For him, the huge bloodshed in Iraq was proof that the west’s self-proclaimed pursuit of “democracy and freedom” solely brings instability and struggling in its wake. If you point out the brutal behaviour of Russian forces in Chechnya or Syria in Moscow, you’ll at all times have the Iraq warfare thrown again in your face.

Crucially, the west’s promotion of democracy has posed a direct menace to Putin’s personal political and private survival. From 2003 to 2005, pro-democracy “colour revolutions” broke out in a lot of the states of the former Soviet Union – together with Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. If demonstrators in Independence Square in Kyiv may deliver down an autocratic authorities in Ukraine, what was to cease the similar occurring in Red Square? In Russia, many believed it was a “fairytale” that these had been spontaneous uprisings. As a former intelligence operative whose complete skilled profession had concerned operating “black operations”, Putin was significantly inclined to see the CIA as pulling the strings. The objective, as the Kremlin noticed it, was to put in pro-western puppet regimes. Russia itself might be subsequent.

The shock of the Iraq warfare and the color revolutions had been the latest experiences that knowledgeable Putin’s Munich speech in 2007. And, as the Kremlin noticed it, this sample of western misdeeds continued. Putin factors to the western powers’ 2011 intervention in Libya that resulted in the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi – one thing he believes they’d promised they might not do.

A black, white and red illustration of Muammar Gaddafi’s head
The overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi is a very sore level for Putin

That episode is a very sore spot for Putin, because it passed off throughout the 4 years from 2008 to 2012 when he was serving in the lesser job of prime minister, having stepped apart as president in favour of his acolyte Dmitry Medvedev. As Putin’s supporters see it, a naive Medvedev was duped into supporting a UN decision that allowed for a restricted intervention, just for western powers to exceed their mandate so as to overthrow and kill Gaddafi. They haven’t any time for the response that the Libyan intervention was made on human rights grounds, however that occasions then took on a lifetime of their very own, as the Libyan rebel gained steam.

Medvedev’s alleged naivety in permitting the Libyan intervention proved helpful for Putin, nonetheless: it established the concept that he was indispensable as Russia’s chief. Any substitute, even one chosen by Putin, would depart the nation susceptible to a scheming and ruthless west. In 2011, Putin introduced that he supposed to return as president, after the potential presidential time period had been prolonged to 2 consecutive durations of six years. This announcement provoked uncommon public demonstrations in Moscow and different cities, which once more fanned Putin’s fears about western schemes to undermine his energy. I used to be in Moscow in January 2012 and witnessed the marches and banners, a few of which carried pointed references to Gaddafi’s destiny. Putin understood the parallels. He commented publicly about how disgusted he had been by the footage of Gaddafi’s homicide – which maybe mirrored a sure concern about his personal potential destiny. The proven fact that Hillary Clinton, then America’s Secretary of State, expressed public help for the 2012 demonstrations was deeply resented by Putin and will have justified, in his thoughts, Russia’s efforts to undermine Clinton’s presidential marketing campaign in 2016.

Putin secured his re-election, however his sense that the west remained a menace to Russia was additional stoked by occasions in Ukraine in 2013-14. The prospect of that nation signing an association agreement with the European Union was seen as a severe menace in the Kremlin, since it could pull Russia’s most essential neighbour – as soon as an integral a part of the USSR – into the west’s sphere of affect. Under strain from Moscow, the Ukrainian government of President Viktor Yanukovych reversed course. But this provoked one other well-liked rebellion in Kyiv, forcing Yanukovych to flee. The lack of a compliant ally in Kyiv was a significant geopolitical reverse for the Kremlin.


Putin’s response was to dramatically elevate the stakes, by crossing the line into the use of army pressure. In February 2014, Russia invaded and annexed Crimea, a area that was a part of Ukraine however had belonged to Russia till 1954 and was populated largely by Russian-speakers. It was additionally, by settlement with the Ukrainians, the dwelling of Russia’s Black Sea fleet. In the west, the annexation of Crimea, together with Russian army intervention in jap Ukraine, was seen as a flagrant violation of worldwide regulation that many feared might be the prelude to additional acts of aggression.

But in Russia, the annexation was extensively greeted as a triumph – it represented the nation’s fightback. Putin’s approval scores in unbiased opinion polls soared to over 80%. In the rapid afterglow, he got here nearer to reaching the final objective of the strongman ruler: the full identification of the nation with the chief. Vyacheslav Volodin, the speaker of the Russian parliament, exulted: “If there’s Putin, there’s Russia. If there’s no Putin, there’s no Russia.” Putin himself crowed that Crimea had been taken with out a shot being fired.

The west’s response was to slap financial sanctions on Russia. But western indignation didn’t final lengthy. Four years later, Russia hosted a profitable World Cup. At the last, Putin sat with the presidents of France and Croatia, two EU nations, in the VIP field in Moscow.

An illustration of a red tap on a pipe, against a grey background

The ease with which Putin annexed Crimea – and the swiftness with which the west appeared ready to forgive – could have laid the floor for an unjustified confidence that led to the invasion of Ukraine. His overreach can be a reminder of the flaws in the strongman mannequin of management. Decades in workplace may cause a frontrunner to succumb to megalomania or paranoia. The elimination of checks and balances, the centralisation of energy and the promotion of a cult of character make it extra probably {that a} chief will make a disastrous mistake. For all these causes, strongman rule is an inherently flawed and harmful mannequin of presidency.

Tragically, that lesson is being realized over again – in Russia and Ukraine. An invasion that was meant to safe Russia’s place as an amazing energy and Putin’s place in historical past has clearly gone incorrect. Putin is now concerned in a brutal warfare of attrition. Western sanctions will see the Russian financial system shrink dramatically this 12 months, and the Russian middle-class is witnessing the disappearance of a lot of the client items and journey alternatives that emerged with the finish of the chilly warfare.

The unofficial objective of western coverage is clearly to pressure Putin from energy. But the endgame could not come as swiftly as we want. Deeply entrenched in his decades-long mission, Putin is now even much less probably to surrender energy voluntarily, since his successors may repudiate his insurance policies, and even put him on trial.

The prospects for well-liked rebellion are equally poor, regardless of the many courageous Russians who have indicated their disgust over the warfare. Any protests are prone to be swiftly crushed with violence and imprisonment, as they had been in neighbouring Belarus in 2020 and 2021. A 3rd situation – the chance of an enlightened group inside the elite seizing energy – appears out of attain, too. Organising a palace coup towards Putin shall be very tough: all dissenters had been purged from the Kremlin way back. Putin additionally takes his private safety very significantly: several of his former bodyguards have become rich in their very own proper. While there shall be many inside Russia who are dismayed by the course that occasions have taken, orchestrating that diffuse discontent right into a coherent plot appears like a formidable problem.

The tough reality is that Putin’s strongman fashion has outlined his rule over Russia – and regardless of his many crimes and misdemeanours, those self same strongman ways could protect him in energy for years to return.

Gideon Rachman is chief overseas affairs commentator for the Financial Times. His new ebook, The Age of the Strongman, is revealed by Vintage (£20). To help The Guardian and Observer, order your copy at guardianbookshop.com. Delivery prices could apply.

Source link